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ACCESS TO BANK CREDIT AFTER CORPORATE DEFAULT*




During the last decade the literature on the factors affecting corporate default increased exponen-
tially. This growth was to a large extent spurred by the discussions around the implementation of 
Basel II.1 However, surprisingly little is known about what happens to ﬁ  rms after they default on their 
bank loans. How many ﬁ  rms are able to overcome the ﬁ  nancial distress that led to the default on 
bank loans? Do these ﬁ  rms regain access to credit? How fast is this process? Which ﬁ  rms have 
more difﬁ  culty in regaining access? In this article, we shed some light on these important questions.
In this study, we take the occurrence of defaults as given and analyse what happens to the ability 
of ﬁ  rms to access credit markets after an episode of ﬁ  nancial distress. This is a relevant question, 
as not all the ﬁ  rms that default on their debts are economically unviable. In many cases, ﬁ  rms de-
fault on their liabilities due to unexpected events which do not compromise their economic viability. 
This question relates closely to the literature on default recoveries (Antunes (2005), Altman et al. 
(2005) or Bruche and González-Aguado (2010) are examples of some relevant contributions to this 
literature) but it goes one step further and asks about the ability to borrow again after an episode of 
ﬁ  nancial distress.
In order to undertake this project we use a unique Portuguese dataset, the Central Credit Register 
(CRC), which includes data on all loans above 50 euros that were granted during the period 1995-
2008. This data is shared by all ﬁ  nancial institutions, thus mitigating the traditional asymmetric 
information problem between lenders and borrowers.
This project would be interesting in any context, but the recent increase in loan defaults worldwide 
makes it even more relevant. Even though some of the ﬁ  rms currently facing difﬁ  culties in honouring 
their debt may ﬁ  le for bankruptcy, many ﬁ  rms are expected to survive. By analysing under what con-
ditions do ﬁ  rms regain access to credit, we expect to provide relevant and timely empirical evidence 
on this issue.
(1)  In the Basel II International Capital Accord banks are allowed, under some conditions, to use their own internal credit risk models to determine capital 
requirements. These internal models must allow for a rigorous calculation of default probabilities, hence motivating the extensive research on credit 
risk modelling during the last decade.
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This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review of the literature on default 
and recoveries and in Section 3 we describe the dataset used. Our main results are analysed in two 
separate sections: in Section 4 we examine in some detail what is happening to ﬁ  rms while they are 
in default, whereas in Section 5 we focus our analysis on what happens to ﬁ  rms after they are no 
longer classiﬁ  ed as being in default. In Section 6 we summarize our main ﬁ  ndings.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The bulk of empirical research on default and recovery after ﬁ  nancial distress focuses on publicly 
traded ﬁ  rms in the United States, with an emphasis on bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation 
procedures.2 For instance, Franks and Torous (1989), Platt and Platt (1991), Bandopadhyaya (1994), 
Helwege (1999), and Denis and Rodgers (2007) all consider samples of publicly traded ﬁ  rms that ﬁ  le 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to analyse the effect of various regressors as well as time 
on the duration of default. The time in default ranges from 16-32 months on average, but size (meas-
ured by liabilities, number of employees, or number of creditors) is an important determinant of the 
duration of default, with smaller ﬁ  rms exiting sooner (Denis and Rodgers (2007), Morrison (2007)).
Post default performance of large ﬁ  rms appears to be poor. On average, only 29 per cent of ﬁ  rms 
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization successfully reorganize each year, but Hotchkiss et al. 
(2008) note that many of the conﬁ  rmed reorganizations are, in fact, liquidation plans. Analysis of 
post-bankruptcy cash ﬂ  ows for 89 ﬁ  rms by Alderson and Betker (1999) corroborates earlier ﬁ  nd-
ings by Hotchkiss (1995), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) that 
operating margins are poor and debt ratios are above industry median levels post-bankruptcy. As a 
consequence of this performance, recidivism rates are high, with one-quarter to one-third of ﬁ  rms 
subsequently restructuring their debt within ﬁ  ve years of initially emerging from bankruptcy. Acharya 
et al. (2007) also ﬁ  nd that creditor recoveries are signiﬁ  cantly lower when the ﬁ  rms in default operate 
in a distressed industry.
It is clear that the experiences of publicly traded US ﬁ  rms are not representative of the overall uni-
verse of ﬁ  rms, which, on average, have only 25 employees.  However, few papers examine small 
or privately-held ﬁ  rms; Berkowitz and White (2004) is one notable exception. The authors consider 
how personal bankruptcy procedures affect small ﬁ  rms’ access to credit in an environment where 
unincorporated ﬁ  rms debts are the liabilities of the ﬁ  rm owner. Therefore, if the ﬁ  rm fails, the owner 
can ﬁ le for bankruptcy and business, as well as unsecured personal debts, will be discharged. Using 
variation in personal bankruptcy exemptions across US states, it is found that small business are 
more likely to be denied credit if they are located in states with high homestead exemptions, and if 
loans are received, the values are smaller, with higher interest rates.
Analysis on ﬁ  rm default and recovery outside of the US is limited, but such analysis is important 
since bankruptcy and liquidation procedures vary across the world. In general, Claessens and Klap-
(2)  Our literature review focuses on research related to what happens to ﬁ rms after an episode of ﬁ nancial distress. However, there are also some rel-
evant recent papers that examine post-distress patterns amongst other borrower types, namely personal bankruptcy (Cohen-Cole et al. (2009) and 
Han and Li (2009)), commercial real estate loans (Brown et al. (2006)) and home mortgages (Adelino et al. (2009) and Haughwout et al. (2009)).  Articles  |  Part II
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per (2005) ﬁ  nd that bankruptcy ﬁ  ling rates are higher in countries with more efﬁ  cient judicial sys-
tems. In response to different degrees of creditor protection, Davydenko and Franks (2008) ﬁ  nd that 
banks in France, Germany, and the UK signiﬁ  cantly adjust their lending and reorganization to the 
national bankruptcy code. At the time of loan origination collateral requirements will directly reﬂ  ect a 
bank’s ability to realize assets upon default. As a result, adjustments by banks will be able to reduce, 
but not fully eliminate, the effect of the bankruptcy code on default outcomes.
Evidence on the duration and severity of defaults by ﬁ  rms outside the US is also scarce. Franks 
and Sussman (2005) consider a sample of 542 small- and medium-sized ﬁ  nancially distressed UK 
ﬁ  rms that are transferred to their bank’s workout unit, ﬁ  nding that, on average, these ﬁ  rms spend 7.5 
months in the bank’s workout unit and 60 percent of ﬁ  rms in the sample operate as going concerns. 
Secured creditors in the country fare well within the formal bankruptcy regime and 75 per cent of 
small ﬁ  rms that default subsequently enter formal bankruptcy receivership (Franks and Sussman, 
2005), while average bank recovery rates are 75 per cent as ﬁ  rm assets are pledged as collateral 
to banks in most cases. In a study of Sweden’s auction bankruptcy system for small ﬁ  rms, Thorburn 
(2000) ﬁ  nds that three-quarters of ﬁ  rms are auctioned as going concerns, and the direct costs aver-
age 6.4 per cent of pre-ﬁ  ling value of assets, suggesting that it is an efﬁ  cient restructuring mecha-
nism for small ﬁ  rms. In Portugal, Antunes (2005) ﬁ  nds that the severity of default inﬂ  uences the 
probability of liquidation, but the number of employees is the largest determinant of the time proﬁ  le 
of the liquidation/ recovery process.
Finally, another important dimension of the costs of default are the losses incurred directly (and 
indirectly) by banks. The implementation of Basel II contributed to some expansion of the literature 
on recovery rates and loss given default (LGD). Some recent examples are Altman et al. (2005), 
Carvalho and Dermine (2006), Bruche and González-Aguado (2010), and Bastos (2010).
3. DATA
The main data source used in this paper is the Central Credit Register (CRC), which is held and man-
aged by Banco de Portugal. Financial institutions granting credit in Portugal are obliged to report to the 
CRC, on a monthly basis, all loans granted above 50 euros.3 This database includes information on 
loan amounts as well as some loan characteristics. It is possible to know if the loan is a joint or single li-
ability, or if it is an off-balance sheet item (such as the undrawn amount of a credit line or a credit card). 
More importantly for the purposes of our study, the database includes information on loan defaults and 
renegotiations. All ﬁ  nancial institutions are obliged to report data to the CRC and are allowed to con-
sult information on their current and prospective borrowers, with their previous consent. As a result, 
when granting a new loan, a bank can easily observe whether the applicant has any amount of credit 
overdue at that moment, as well as the total amount borrowed from different banks.
Using information contained in the CRC between 1995 and 2008, we identify all ﬁ  rms that record 
(3)  Due to the conﬁ dentiality of the information used in this work, data was treated anonymously and within Banco de Portugal.  Part II  | Articles
Banco de Portugal |   Financial Stability Report November 2010 4
at least one episode of default during this period.4 In the CRC, a default can be classiﬁ  ed as a loan 
with late repayment (coded as Type 7 in the database) or as a liability involving litigation (coded as 
Type 8).5 We consider that there is a default only when a ﬁ  rm records a loan in either of these two 
categories for an entire quarter. This avoids mining the data with very short-lived episodes, possibly 
related to reporting errors or problems in bank transfers, for instance.6 
Our unit of observation is a ﬁ  rm-quarter pair. Using quarterly data for the period 1995-2008, there 
are more than 1 million default observations, referring to 165,165 different default episodes in more 
than 100 thousand ﬁ  rms. We consider that a ﬁ  rm emerges from default when it does not record a 
default on bank loans in a given quarter, but it was in default during the entire previous quarter. This 
may mean that the ﬁ  rm is observed in the CRC but with no records referring to outstanding defaults, 
or that the ﬁ  rm is no longer present in the CRC. This latter possibility may imply that the ﬁ  rm was 
extinguished or that the ﬁ  rm continues to operate but without access to bank credit.
The amount and quality of the information available are superior to that used in most papers focus-
ing on default recoveries, which usually analyse only a limited set of publicly traded ﬁ  rms, and allow 
us to conduct a richer analysis.7
4. WHAT HAPPENS WHILE FIRMS ARE IN DEFAULT?
What happens after the day the bank records the ﬁ  rst default on a ﬁ  rms’ debt? In this section we 
analyse what happens between that moment and the day the default is resolved. Our analysis of 
default spells will focus on the time and amounts in default, as well as on the severity of default and 
the losses recorded by banks.
In Table 1 we present some of the main characteristics of the default episodes that we observe. 
During our sample period there was a substantial expansion of credit to ﬁ  rms in Portugal, as shown 
by the signiﬁ  cant increase in the number of ﬁ  rms with access to loans (column 1). As discussed in 
Antão et al. (2009), the liberalization of the Portuguese ﬁ  nancial system in the late 1980s and early 
1990s created the conditions for an expansion of credit granted to the private sector. This growth 
was fuelled by the signiﬁ  cant decrease in bank interest rates during the 1990s, as the economy 
gradually converged to meet the euro accession criteria. The participation in the euro area improved 
the funding conditions of Portuguese banks in international wholesale markets, with virtually no ex-
change rate risk, thus further contributing to improve the access of Portuguese non-ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms to 
bank loans. Against this background, loans granted to non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms increased by an average 
annual growth rate of 12 per cent during these years, reﬂ  ecting not only an increase in the amount 
of loans granted to each ﬁ  rm (column 2), but also an increase in the number of ﬁ  rms that obtain ac-
(4)  We exclude unincorporated businesses from this analysis, as their assets are not autonomous from those of the owner. For statistical purposes, these 
businesses are usually classiﬁ  ed as households.
(5)  For further details on this database, please see http://www.bportugal.pt/en-US/PublicacoeseIntervencoes/Banco/CadernosdoBanco/Tumbnails%20
List%20Template/Central%20Credit%20Register.pdf.
(6)  We do not include loan write-offs in the deﬁ nition of default, even though this information is also available in the CRC. This choice is motivated by the 
fact that when a bank writes-off a loan from its books it is implicitly assuming that the probability of repayment is very small, though still positive.
(7)  In Portugal there are less than one hundred publicly traded companies, while in 2008 there were more than 350 thousand ﬁ rms operating in the 
country. This number highlights how partial and incomplete would the results be if our study would focus only on these companies.  Articles  |  Part II
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cess to credit (column 3). In fact, around 80 per cent of the ﬁ  rms analysed started to have access 
to credit after 1995Q1.
Column (4) refers to the number of ﬁ  rms that, in each quarter, record any amount in default and 
Column (5) presents the percentage of ﬁ  rms in default, computed as the ratio between the number 
of ﬁ  rms in default (column 4) and the total number of ﬁ  rms with a loan (column 1), in each quarter. 
We observe that this percentage had a U-shaped evolution, having decreased during the late 90s, 
but increasing again in the more recent years.
The average amount in default is slightly above 100 thousand euros per ﬁ  rm (column 6). This av-
erage amount decreased steadily during the sample period. Thus, even though there were more 
ﬁ  rms defaulting over time, the average size of the defaults became smaller. In Columns (7) and (8) 
we depict the credit overdue ratios for ﬁ  rms in default. These ratios decreased slightly during this 
period.8 Hence, even though defaults became more frequent, their size and severity decreased 
simultaneously.
Finally, the new episodes of default reported in columns (9), (10) and (11) refer to defaults recorded 
by ﬁ  rms without any default in the previous quarter. In column (11) we present the number of new 
default episodes as a percentage of the number of ﬁ  rms with a loan (column 1), i.e., the default rate. 
The average amount initially in default is much smaller than the average total amount in default, as 
may be observed from the comparison of columns (6) and (10). Default rates peaked in 2002, pos-
sibly reﬂ  ecting the increase in interest rates and the marked slowdown of economic activity after 
2000 (Chart 1). The number of new default episodes and the default rate increased substantially 
since 2007, thus illustrating the deterioration in credit quality induced by the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
How long do ﬁ  rms stay in default? In Chart 2 we depict the hazard function, deﬁ  ned as the probabil-
ity of a ﬁ  rm leaving default in the time interval  ) , tt d t ⎡ + ⎢⎣ , conditional on being in default,
Pr( | )






and in Chart 3 we present the survivor function, deﬁ  ned as the probability of remaining in default 
until t ,
() P r ( ) 1 () St T t Ft =≥ = −
The exit rate from default drops sharply in the ﬁ  rst 2 years, from around 20 per cent to slightly more 
than 6 per cent (Chart 2). This suggests that when a default episode is not resolved within the ﬁ  rst 
quarters, then it may take a long time to be cleared. The median default duration is 5 quarters.
During the period that ﬁ  rms remain in default their default intensity worsens, as illustrated in Table 2. 
(8)  In column (7), the credit overdue ratio is deﬁ ned as the sum of loans in late repayment and in litigation at the end of each quarter, as a percentage of 
total credit granted to that ﬁ  rm. In column (8) this deﬁ  nition is extended to include off-balance sheet liabilities in the denominator of this ratio (these 
include the unused amounts of credit lines, for instance).  Articles  |  Part II
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We observe that, as would be expected, the amount of credit overdue varies positively with the time 
in default. The same can be observed for the credit overdue ratio, which increases from 38 per cent 
of total credit when the ﬁ  rm ﬁ  rst records a default, to 75 per cent if the ﬁ  rm remains in default for at 
least another year and a half. The total amount outstanding is smaller for ﬁ  rms with longer default 
spans, thus suggesting that larger ﬁ  rms exit default earlier.
A default does not necessarily generate losses for the banks. Indeed, when the default is originated 
by a small and temporary episode of ﬁ  nancial distress, it would be expected that most ﬁ  rms are able 
to overcome such difﬁ  culties and pay back the amount overdue, eventually after some renegotia-
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Chart 3
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tion of the loan’s terms and conditions with the bank. To shed some light on this issue, in Table 3 
we present estimates of losses incurred by banks, based on write-offs and write-downs reported 
to the Central Credit Register. It should be noted that these losses do not include recovery costs 
and, more importantly, do not consider collateral, as this information is not available in the CRC for 
the period considered. Losses are displayed as a percentage of total loans outstanding after the 
default episode ends (i.e., once the ﬁ  rm does not record late repayments or loans in litigation in the 
following quarter).
In Table 3 we present two main statistics regarding bank losses due to written-off loans. The ﬁ  rst is 
the unconditional loss, that is, given all default episodes, what is the average loss incurred by the 
bank (columns (1) to (5)). In this case we ﬁ  nd that on average any given default will generate a loss 
due to write-offs of 10.3 per cent of the total amount outstanding at the time the default episode 
ends. This ﬁ  gure is much lower than the 45 per cent loss given default rate considered for corporate 
uncollateralised loans in the foundation approach of Basel II. However, as we do not have informa-
tion on collateral, this comparison is not straightforward.
The second statistic is the conditional loss, that is, given all default episodes that lead to a write-
off, what is the average loss incurred by the bank (columns (6) to (10)). For this case, the ﬁ  gure is 
substantially higher, 33.7 per cent, but this large difference comes mainly from the fact that a large 
majority of default episodes do not lead to any write-off (only 30 per cent of default events generate 
a write-off for the bank).
Finally, when we consider only default episodes that took longer to resolve (in this case, when the 
default spell is longer than 1 year), we ﬁ  nd that the unconditional loss almost doubles (18.2 per cent 
vs. 10.3 per cent).
Table 2
EVOLUTION OF THE FIRMS’ SITUATION SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE DEFAULT EPISODE
Number of 
observations
Amount of credit overdue 
(euros)
Credit overdue ratio (%) Amount of total credit 
outstanding (euros)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firms in default 
for:
(in quarters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 165 165 31 919 2 870 37.9 13.9 375 300 30 170
2 110 208 48 675 5 000 49.9 36.9 327 402 26 302
3 86 674 63 107 7 071 58.4 67.3 315 105 24 890
4 70 016 77 239 9 510 64.4 88.4 307 386 25 115
5 60 348 87 083 11 220 69.5 98.9 296 448 24 753
6 50 377 96 381 12 450 72.8 100.0 332 136 24 773
7 42 618 106 597 14 690 75.4 100.0 291 051 26 115
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: In this table are depicted ﬁ rm and loan characteristics for ﬁ rms that have been in default for 1 quarter (line 1), 2 quarters (line 2), etc., up to 7 
quarters. In each line, the variables refer to the situation in the x quarter after the default episode began.   Articles  |  Part II
9 Financial Stability Report November 2010  |  Banco de Portugal
5. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER FIRMS LEAVE DEFAULT?
There are two main possible outcomes after ﬁ  rms exit default: the ﬁ  rms can become extinct, enter-
ing liquidation, bankruptcy or being acquired; or the ﬁ  rms can survive and overcome the ﬁ  nancial 
distress that eventually led to default. In the latter case, ﬁ  rms can regain access to credit or they 
can continue to operate without bank loans (either because they prefer to use alternative funding 
sources or because banks are not willing to give them credit anymore). In Table 4 we analyse these 
possible outcomes in the quarter immediately after default is resolved.
A default episode is considered to be resolved if there is no record of loans with late repayments or 
in litigation in the following quarter. We exclude ﬁ  rms that were in default in 2008Q4, the last quarter 
in the sample, as we do not have information on what happens to these ﬁ  rms afterwards. Column (2) 
considers the number of default episodes resolved as a percentage of the number of observations in 
default. Even though the number of default episodes that are resolved each year increased substan-
tially during the sample period, the “exit rate” from default was relatively stable during these years.9
A rough estimate suggests that at least 12 per cent of the ﬁ  rms that disappear from the CRC after 
default are still operating afterwards. This estimate was conducted by searching for the ﬁ  rms that 
are not in the CRC in the 3 years after default in another dataset, Quadros de Pessoal. This data-
base covers all Portuguese ﬁ  rms with more than 10 employees. Hence, the estimate presented is a 
lower bound for the number of ﬁ  rms that no longer have access to credit markets after default. From 
(9)  In 2008 the value is substantially lower than for the other years because the last quarter of 2008 was excluded from the analysis.
Table 3 
ESTIMATES OF LOSSES INCURRED BY THE BANKS
Bank losses due to written-off loans: 
including all loans
Bank losses due to written-off loans: 
only including events that originated a 
write-off
Bank losses due to written-off 
loans: including all loans whose 
default was longer than 1 year
N mean p50 p75 p99 N mean p1 p50 p99 N mean p50 p99
%%%% %%%% %%%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1995 5 880 2.6 0.0 0.0 86.2 553 28.0 0.01 9.4 99.6 3 861 3.2 0.0 88.9
1996 6 229 6.9 0.0 0.0 97.0 1 235 34.7 0.04 19.4 99.9 3 851 8.9 0.0 98.7
1997 6 778 4.8 0.0 0.0 93.3 1 238 26.0 0.02 10.1 99.7 3 925 6.3 0.0 96.6
1998 8 626 8.7 0.0 0.0 99.3 1 805 41.8 0.00 35.0 100.0 5 889 11.5 0.0 99.8
1999 6 042 9.1 0.0 0.0 99.6 1 215 45.3 0.03 38.1 100.0 3 675 14.4 0.0 99.9
2000 6 382 8.5 0.0 0.0 98.9 1 354 40.1 0.02 26.8 99.9 3 501 12.9 0.0 99.5
2001 10 614 9.8 0.0 0.6 99.9 3 397 30.6 0.00 6.5 100.0 4 906 17.6 0.0 100.0
2002 12 234 9.8 0.0 0.7 99.0 3 840 31.2 0.00 8.6 99.9 6 220 17.8 0.0 99.8
2003 11 956 8.4 0.0 0.4 99.3 3 735 27.0 0.00 4.5 99.9 5 655 15.8 0.0 99.8
2004 13 163 11.1 0.0 1.5 99.7 4 627 31.7 0.00 8.0 100.0 6 740 19.2 0.0 99.8
2005 13 662 14.6 0.0 2.9 99.9 5 030 39.7 0.00 17.4 100.0 7 000 26.1 0.0 100.0
2006 14 636 15.4 0.0 4.5 99.9 5 761 39.0 0.00 18.3 100.0 7 230 29.0 1.5 100.0
2007 15 166 11.5 0.0 2.6 99.5 5 686 30.7 0.00 8.4 99.9 5 713 27.8 4.2 99.9
2008 12 945 11.2 0.0 3.1 99.6 4 828 30.1 0.01 10.3 99.9 5 327 25.1 4.2 99.9
Total 144 313 10.3 0.0 0.8 99.7 44 304 33.7 0.00 11.1 100.0 73 493 18.2 0.0 99.9
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Estimates of losses incurred by the banks are based on write-offs and write-downs reported by banks to the CRC.   Part II  | Articles
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the 5,602 ﬁ  rms that cannot be found in the CRC in the 3 years after the default is cleared (consider-
ing only defaults resolved until 2006), at least 686 ﬁ  rms are found to still be operating, but without 
having access to bank loans. Given this, the maximum bankruptcy or liquidation rate after default is 
around 8 per cent, thus showing that most ﬁ  rms are able to overcome a default episode. We also ﬁ  nd 
evidence of a signiﬁ  cant recidivism pattern: almost half of the ﬁ  rms that overcome their ﬁ  rst default 
episode record at least another default episode in the following 3 years (column 7).10
We can distinguish between two types of re-access: i) simple access (summing up columns 10 and 
12); and ii) increased access (considering only column 10). In the former case, we consider that the 
ﬁ  rm has regained access simply if it continues to have access to any bank loans after the default is 
cleared11 (we refer to this deﬁ  nition as “broad access”). In the latter, we consider a stricter access 
deﬁ  nition and take into account only those cases in which the ﬁ  rm had access to a new loan after 
default (“strict access”). As we do not have information on a loan-by-loan basis, we consider all 
cases in which the total amount outstanding is larger than that observed when the default ended.12
Focusing on what happens in the quarter immediately after the ﬁ  rms’ ﬁ  rst default episode is re-
solved, we observe that the access rates depend crucially on the access deﬁ  nition we use. In the 
case of the strict access, only 13 per cent of ﬁ  rms were able to increase their bank credit in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter after default. With respect to the broad access deﬁ  nition, the numbers are substantially dif-
ferent. In this case, 59 per cent of ﬁ  rms had access to credit in the ﬁ  rst quarter after resolving the 
default.13 Hence, most ﬁ  rms do not face a long exclusion from credit markets as a penalty for their 
past defaults. Over time these two statistics had different paths. While in the case of strict access 
there was a fairly monotone decrease, in the case of broad access there was some volatility during 
the sample period: instantaneous access rates decreased until 1998, but peaked in 2002. After-
wards, there was a gradual decrease.
We consider two additional possible outcomes after default: ﬁ  rms that have access to loans but still 
record some written-off loans (9 per cent) and ﬁ  rms only with written-off loans, i.e., no access (14 
per cent). These two outcomes lie somewhere between default and access. On one hand, these 
ﬁ  rms are not technically in default. On the other hand, we cannot consider that the problems gener-
ated by the default event are fully overcome.
In Chart 4 we compare the distribution of possible outcomes after default in two different moments 
in time: 1 quarter (as in Table 4) and 3 years after the ﬁ  rst default episode was cleared. The differ-
ences are signiﬁ  cant. The percentage of ﬁ  rms which is able to obtain new bank loans is one of the 
few outcomes that remains relatively stable (13 per cent versus 11 per cent). However, when the 
broad access deﬁ  nition is considered, the percentage of ﬁ  rms with access drops substantially, from 
59 to 30 per cent. This decrease is offset by the increase in the percentage of ﬁ  rms which disappear 
(10) Adelino et al. (2009) and Haughwout et al. (2009) ﬁ nd evidence of signiﬁ cant recidivism problems in mortgages (the latter paper focuses on subprime 
loans). In both papers, the authors examine the interaction between renegotiation and the incentives for repeated defaults.
(11) In fact, most ﬁ  rms never lose access to credit completely while they are in default, as ﬁ  rms usually default only in a part of their total outstanding 
commitments.
(12) Given that a signiﬁ cant part of loans to ﬁ rms has short maturities, a ﬁ rm may have had access to a new loan (or loan renewal) even if the total outstand-
ing amount did not increase. This access deﬁ nition may then be too strict, thus justifying the need to consider the two alternative deﬁ  nitions.
(13) The 59% ﬁ gure is the sum of the last row of columns (11) and (13) from Table 4.  Articles  |  Part II
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from the CRC after default (from 18 to 32 per cent), as well as by the ﬁ  rms that re-enter default (23 
per cent after 3 years have gone by).
In Charts 5 and 6 we depict the survival functions for the two access deﬁ  nitions. In both cases, most 
ﬁ  rms regain access almost immediately. In the stricter access deﬁ  nition (Chart 5), we observe that 
the ﬁ rms that regain access are able to do it very soon after the default ended. Access rates are high 
during the ﬁ  rst quarters and then stabilize at very low values. If the ﬁ  rm does not show an increase 
in bank loans in the ﬁ  rst quarters after the default is cleared, it is very unlikely that it will ever do. In 
fact, almost 60 per cent of the ﬁ  rms never regain access to new bank loans.
When the broader deﬁ  nition of access is considered, the results are fairly similar. However, in this 
case the time of exclusion is even shorter. Most ﬁ  rms are able to regain access immediately. The 
probability of regaining access decreases dramatically in the second quarter after default ended. 
Around 25 per cent of the ﬁ  rms never regain access to bank loans (Chart 6).
Hence, regardless of the access deﬁ  nition used, we observe that when a ﬁ  rm is not able to regain 
access soon after the default is cleared, the probability that it will ever be able to do so becomes 
very low.
In order to better understand why some ﬁ  rms are able to regain access relatively fast after exiting 
default, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model for the time until access, such that:
()() 0 ,, ii htX kX h =β
where  () k .  is a non-negative function of  i X  and β , the vectors of covariates and parameters, and 
0 h  is the baseline hazard. In this model, the baseline hazard is common to all ﬁ  rms and individual 
hazard functions differ from each other proportionally, with  () k .  representing the factor of propor-
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
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tionality. One advantage of this method is that it is a semi-parametric approach, thus allowing us to 
estimate β without specifying the form of the baseline hazard. Under this setup, the regressors do 
not affect the shape of the overall hazard function, conditioning only the relative failure risk of each 
ﬁ  rm. The failure risk is deﬁ  ned as the time until a ﬁ  rm regains access to credit (using our two different 
access deﬁ  nitions) after it has overcome its ﬁ  rst default episode.
The estimation results are shown in Table 5. Columns (1) to (4) refer to the broad access deﬁ  nition, 
whereas columns (5) to (8) consider the strict deﬁ  nition. The columns differ in the time controls 
used, as discussed below. In these regressions, an estimated coefﬁ  cient lower than 1 should be 
interpreted as contributing to a longer time until access (and the opposite for a coefﬁ  cient above 1).
Taking the total amount of credit outstanding as a proxy for ﬁ  rm size, we observe that larger ﬁ  rms 
regain access faster (columns (1) to (4)). However, this result is not strongly statistically signiﬁ  cant 
when we consider the time it takes a ﬁ  rm to regain access to a new bank loan after default (columns 
(5) to (8)). The intensity of the default episode is a key determinant in the process of regaining ac-
cess: ﬁ  rms that recorded higher credit overdue ratios and higher loss rates take more time to regain 
access to credit, especially in the broad deﬁ  nition. The impact of default duration goes in the same 
direction, but now the effect is stronger for the stricter access deﬁ  nition, i.e., a longer default harms 
the ability of ﬁ  rms to have access to new bank loans.
The choice of the number of bank relationships also seems to inﬂ  uence how easily ﬁ  rms regain ac-
cess after default, though only in the broader deﬁ  nition.14 Firms that borrow from more banks take 
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Source: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Analysis time deﬁ ned as quarters since the end of the ﬁ rst default 
episode. The survivor estimate is deﬁ ned as the probability of regaining 
access after default at  () ( ) () :P r o b 1 tS t T t F t =≥ = − . More ac-
cess is deﬁ  ned as having a larger amount of outstanding bank loans (in-
cluding credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and not having 
any record of default or write-offs.
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Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Analysis time deﬁ ned as quarters since the end of the ﬁ rst default 
episode. The survivor estimate is deﬁ ned as the probability of regaining 
access after default at  () ( ) () :P r o b 1 tS t T t F t =≥ = − . Access is 
deﬁ ned as having a positive amount of outstanding bank loans (including 
credit lines) without any record of default or write-offs, after having left 
default.
Chart 6
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Table 5 
COX REGRESSIONS: DETERMINANTS OF TIME UNTIL ACCESS
Failure event: access (broad deﬁ  nition) Failure event: access (strict deﬁ  nition)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) 1.016 1.015 1.015 1.015 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
9.76 9.24 8.83 9.29 2.10 1.73 1.58 1.74
Credit overdue ratio (%) 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997
-61.40 -63.49 -63.61 -63.47 -6.11 -9.83 -10.34 -9.83
Loss rate (%) 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980
-37.74 -37.62 -37.73 -37.61 -20.14 -19.99 -19.93 -19.99
Duration of default (quarters) 0.937 0.939 0.940 0.939 0.921 0.927 0.928 0.927
-48.85 -47.26 -46.51 -47.24 -28.25 -26.26 -25.79 -26.25
No. of bank relationships 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.956 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
-23.71 -24.07 -23.98 -24.09 1.85 1.45 1.40 1.44
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
-31.97 -31.03 -30.87 -31.04 -15.78 -15.22 -15.06 -15.22
Default with main bank (binary) 1.058 1.063 1.063 1.063 0.877 0.896 0.898 0.896
11.86 12.75 12.61 12.80 -8.02 -6.69 -6.58 -6.68
R e c e s s i o n  ( b i n a r y ) --- 1 . 0 9 2 --- 1 . 1 0 3
--- 6 . 2 5 --- 1 . 8 6
D _ 1 9 9 6 -1 . 1 4 5-1 . 1 4 5-1 . 4 2 1-1 . 4 2 1
-1 3 . 8 2-1 3 . 8 2-1 0 . 0 3-1 0 . 0 4
D_1997 - 1.170 - 1.170 - 1.335 - 1.335
- 16.00 - 16.00 - 8.28 - 8.28
D _ 1 9 9 8 -1 . 1 5 9-1 . 1 5 9-1 . 4 2 4-1 . 4 2 5
- 14.51 - 14.51 - 10.59 - 10.59
D _ 1 9 9 9 -0 . 9 7 7-0 . 9 7 7-1 . 5 1 5-1 . 5 1 5
-- 2 . 0 0-- 2 . 0 0-1 3 . 2 1-1 3 . 2 1
D_2000 - 1.010 - 1.010 - 1.326 - 1.326
-0 . 9 6-0 . 9 6-8 . 4 7-8 . 4 7
D _ 2 0 0 1 -1 . 0 4 0-1 . 0 4 0-1 . 4 8 5-1 . 4 8 5
- 4.78 - 4.79 - 14.31 - 14.31
D_2002 - 0.996 - 0.996 - 1.226 - 1.226
- -0.48 - -0.48 - 7.37 - 7.37
D_2003 - 1.039 - 0.952 - 0.967 - 0.877
- 4.99 - -3.10 - -1.14 - -2.18
D_2004 - 0.932 - 0.912 - 0.852 - 0.831
-- 8 . 2 8-- 9 . 7 6-- 5 . 2 9-- 5 . 5 6
D _ 2 0 0 5 -0 . 9 9 0-0 . 9 9 0-0 . 8 5 6-0 . 8 5 6
-- 1 . 1 0-- 1 . 1 0-- 4 . 9 6-- 4 . 9 6
D_2006 - 0.951 - 0.951 - 0.916 - 0.916
- -5.47 - -5.47 - -2.89 - -2.89
D_2007 - 0.982 - 0.982 - 1.085 - 1.085
- -2.25 - -2.25 - 2.92 - 2.92
Q u a r t e r  d u m m i e s NNYNNNYN
Number of subjects 73 980 73 980 73 980 73 980 73 980 73 980 73 980 73 980
Number of failures 54 282 54 282 54 282 54 282 21 055 21 055 21 055 21 055
Time at risk 384 240 384 240 384 240 384 240 893 125 893 125 893 125 893 125
Log-likelihood -589 282 -589 180 -589 097 -589 177 -226 434 -226 022 -225 864 -226 020
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes:  z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a Cox regression that evaluates the time until access using robust variance estimates. An estimated 
coefﬁ cient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until access. In columns (1) - (4), the dependent variable is the time until access 
using the broad deﬁ nition. In columns (5) - (8) it is considered the strict deﬁ nition of access. All explanatory variables are deﬁ ned as in previous tables 
and refer to the last period of default.  Articles  |  Part II
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more time to regain access to bank loans. Hence, engaging in single bank relationships may provide 
some beneﬁ  ts for ﬁ  rms in ﬁ  nancial distress.15 Moreover, ﬁ  rms that were defaulting on a larger per-
centage of existing bank relationships take more time to regain access to credit, which may also be 
regarded as evidence that more severe default episodes lead to a more prolonged exclusion from 
credit markets.
Finally, in what concerns defaulting with the ﬁ  rms’ main lender, the results are rather mixed: ﬁ  rms 
that default with their main bank seem to have more difﬁ  culties in having access to new loans, but 
the opposite is seen when the broad deﬁ  nition is considered. This result is probably driven by the 
way we deﬁ  ne access in the latter case: as mentioned before, we consider that a ﬁ  rm regains ac-
cess when it records a positive amount of credit outstanding without having any problem loans. 
Thus, if a ﬁ  rm defaults for a given period of time and at some point it is able to repay the debt over-
due, we consider that the ﬁ  rm has regained access. As we observe that most ﬁ  rms actually default 
with their main lender, the time it takes to regain access may be mechanically driven by this feature 
of the data.
As mentioned above, the different columns in Table 5 consider essentially the same explanatory 
variables, with the exception of the time controls. Time effects seem to play a relevant role: ﬁ  rms 
that emerged from default in the earlier years of our sample took less time to regain access to credit 
than ﬁ  rms that defaulted in more recent years. In order to better explore these effects, in columns 
(4) and (8) we include a binary variable for recession years. We ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms that exit default during 
recessions are able to regain access to bank loans sooner, controlling for all other default and loan 
characteristics. This is an interesting result, as it may suggest that when a ﬁ  rm is able to resolve 
a default during adverse times, banks perceive this as being a signal of the quality and strength of 
the ﬁ  rm.16 In particular, banks possibly consider that these ﬁ  rms are of higher quality (in terms of 
creditworthiness) and therefore grant credit faster than if the default resolution had happened in 
non-recession years.17 Moreover, these ﬁ  rms are more likely to have defaulted due to an exogenous 
systematic shock than due to idiosyncratic fragilities, thus supporting this creditworthiness assess-
ment by banks.
The shapes of the survival functions (Charts 5 and 6) show that there is signiﬁ  cant right-censoring in 
our data, especially in the stricter access deﬁ  nition: around 25 per cent of the ﬁ  rms never regain ac-
cess to loans after default and almost 60 per cent never regain access to new bank loans. This pattern 
suggests that we are dealing with defective risks or inﬁ  nite durations, as some ﬁ  rms will never be able 
to regain access. As noted by Addison and Portugal (2003), the presence of defective risks may lead 
to inconsistent estimates of the hazard regression coefﬁ  cients. To address this issue, we estimated 
(15) For instance, Carmignani and Omiccioli (2007) argue that the overall effect of more concentrated banking relationships is a lower probability of liqui-
dation, but a higher probability of ﬁ nancial distress. In turn, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that when there are strong bank-customer relationships, 
banks provide liquidity insurance to ﬁ rms in ﬁ nancial distress.
(16) For robustness purposes, we also considered the effect of entering default during a recession on the time it takes until ﬁ rms regain access to credit, 
but the results are not statistically signiﬁ cant. In addition, we also tried to consider simultaneously the effect of entering and/or leaving default during 
a recession, plus an interaction between these two possibilities (i.e., a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the ﬁ rm enters and leaves default 
during a recession). If this is the case, ﬁ  rms are able to regain access signiﬁ  cantly faster. In contrast, ﬁ  rms that entered default during a recession 
should take more time to regain access. The effect of leaving default during a recession is not signiﬁ cant in this speciﬁ cation.
(17) Acharya et al. (2007) study the impact of industry-wide distress on the recoveries of defaulted ﬁ rms in the US and ﬁ nd that defaulting ﬁ rms that belong 
to industries in distress are more likely to spend more time in bankruptcy. However, these ﬁ  rms are also more likely to be restructured than to be 
acquired or liquidated.  Part II  | Articles
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all the regressions displayed in Table 5 conditional on the ﬁ  rms regaining access (under each of our 
access deﬁ  nitions) during the sample period. This amounts to fully eliminating right censoring in our 
sample: all ﬁ  rms eventually “fail”, that is, they reach the failure event with probability one.18 The results 
for the broad access deﬁ  nition are not qualitatively different from those obtained with unconditional 
estimation, but there are some small differences for the stricter deﬁ  nition of access. First, the posi-
tive inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  rm size on the reduction of the time until the ﬁ  rm obtains a new loan becomes more 
economically and statistically signiﬁ  cant (whereas with unconditional regressions this variable was 
signiﬁ  cant only at a 10 per cent level). Second, the result regarding ﬁ  rms that default with their main 
lender changes its sign: conditional on obtaining a new loan, ﬁ  rms that have defaulted with their main 
lender are able to regain access faster. Hence, defaulting with the main lender affects negatively the 
likelihood of obtaining a new loan, but not the time it takes for that to happen.
Another dimension of post-default behaviour that deserves to be explored is whether ﬁ  rms regain 
access with the banks that were previously lending to them or if they are able to establish new bank 
relationships. In Table 6 we provide some evidence on that issue.
In the quarter immediately after the default episode is cleared, we saw before that 13 per cent of the 
ﬁ  rms have access to a new bank loan (Table 4). From these ﬁ  rms, almost one third obtains that loan 
from a new bank (column (3), Table 6). This percentage was higher in the ﬁ  rst years of the sample 
period. When we examine this situation one and three years after default, we observe that the percent-
(18) The results are not presented in this article but are available upon request.
Table 6 
REGAINING ACCESS THROUGH NEW BANKS




Firms with more access 




Firms with more access 




Firms with more access 
and with a new bank
%%%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1995 3 3 0 1 3 6 4 1 . 2------
1996 6 4 1 2 2 6 3 5 . 3 3 5 6 2 1 0 5 9 . 0---
1997 604 200 33.1 467 282 60.4 - - -
1998 538 214 39.8 529 291 55.0 349 265 75.9
1999 761 227 29.8 534 318 59.6 505 371 73.5
2000 545 223 40.9 469 292 62.3 564 424 75.2
2001 1 189 559 47.0 541 385 71.2 569 481 84.5
2002 1 091 412 37.8 1 239 811 65.5 411 342 83.2
2003 957 262 27.4 766 432 56.4 456 388 85.1
2004 752 188 25.0 670 389 58.1 997 804 80.6
2005 577 171 29.6 630 375 59.5 719 562 78.2
2006 662 160 24.2 547 322 58.9 657 509 77.5
2007 985 266 27.0 652 366 56.1 629 506 80.4
2008 920 177 19.2 892 464 52.0 542 427 78.8
Total 10 552 3 421 32.4 8 292 4 937 59.5 6 398 5 079 79.4
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any 
record of default or write-offs. Firms with more access and with a new bank deﬁ ned as those borrowing from a bank which was not a lender when the 
default episode ended. Only ﬁ  rms with less than 9 bank relationships are considered.   Articles  |  Part II
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age of ﬁ  rms that were able to obtain a loan from a new lender increases markedly (60 per cent after 
one year and 80 per cent after 3 years).
These results must be analysed bearing in mind that the Portuguese Credit Register is designed 
to be an information sharing mechanism between banks. When a ﬁ  rm defaults on a bank loan, the 
other banks currently lending to that ﬁ  rm can observe that. Their prospective lenders can also ask 
to have access to that information, with the ﬁ  rms’ consent, what is usually the common procedure. 
Notwithstanding this, banks seem to be generally willing to give ﬁ  rms a second chance.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we investigated what happens to ﬁ  rms after they default on their bank loan obligations. 
What happens to ﬁ  rms while they are in default? How many ﬁ  rms are able to overcome ﬁ  nancial 
distress and regain access to bank credit? Which default characteristics inﬂ  uence these outcomes? 
We focused our analysis in two different moments: the “in default” and the “post default” periods.
With respect to the “in default” period we ﬁ  nd that i) if a default episode is not resolved within the 
ﬁ  rst quarters, then it may take a long time to be overcome; ii) the duration of default is linked to its 
severity, that is, the more signiﬁ  cant the default is, the longer it takes to be resolved; iiii) only 31 per 
cent of default events lead to loan write-offs; iv) of those loans that lead to a write-off, the average 
loss for the bank is 34 per cent.
Regarding the “post default” period our results show that i) in the ﬁ  rst quarter after exiting default, 
59 per cent of ﬁ  rms have access to credit, but of these, only less than one quarter of the ﬁ  rms was 
able to increase its bank debt; ii) if a ﬁ  rm is not able to regain access to credit in the ﬁ  rst year after 
exiting default then the likelihood of obtaining credit is less than 1 per cent; iii) after three years of 
resolving the default, almost 25% of ﬁ  rms were again defaulting on their bank loan(s); iv) the duration 
of exclusion is strongly related to the severity of the default episode. That is, the larger the amount 
defaulted on, the larger the written-off amount, and the longer the default period, the longer the pe-
riod of exclusion will be; v) ﬁ  rms that are able to exit default during recession periods regain access 
to credit faster.  Part II  | Articles
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